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I MAGNA CARTA 1215 
 
OF TOSH AND METAPHORS 
 
On the 800
th
 anniversary of the reluctant acceptance of a charter of 
rights and obligations by King John of England in 1215, many books have 
been written, essays published and lectures given, examining the 
relevance of this step in the long constitutional history of England (if any) 
and for the world of today. 
Some commentators have doubted any relevance.
 
Lord [Jonathan] 
Sumption, a judge of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, and an 
expert in mediaeval English history, has rejected any significance in what 
sounds to Australian ears as a somewhat condescending remark.
 “High 
minded tosh”, he called it.1 Geoffrey Robertson QC, of Doughty Street 
Chambers, London, via Epping in Sydney, expressed somewhat similar 
views, but more politely.
2 
Michael Beloff QC, in this journal,
3
 has traced 
every case of the past century in which Magna Carta had been cited to 
reach a conclusion that its actual contemporary relevance was small.
 
Other 
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writers and lecturers were willing to find a greater materiality in the 
Charter for the world of today.
4
 
Self-evidently, if we seek to draw a direct line of causation between 
the charter of King John and contemporaneous realities, we will be 
deceiving ourselves.
 
I am not aware of any serious observer who takes 
such a literalistic view of the considerations of history.
 
Certainly, I do not.
 
But those who perceive a link are generally thinking and writing in 
allegorical terms.
 
They appreciate, as I do, a poetic or grand theme.
 
It 
concerns the struggle of people with lesser power to claim rights against 
their rulers, who enjoy great power over their persons, property and 
happiness.
 
If that larger view is taken, the dramatic circumstances in 
which the Magna Carta of 1215 was extracted from King John, becomes a 
kind of symbol for what was to follow. 
Lord Scarman, reflecting on the way the new world order of universal 
human rights was built after 1945 pointed, correctly, to the predominant 
influence played in the language and practice of the United Nations 
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human 
rights treaties, of Anglo-American lawyers.
 
In the enormous power of the 
United States of America (and the United Kingdom) at the end of the 
Second World War, they took the lead in designing the institutions and 
laws for the world that would follow.
 
Naturally enough, they were aware 
of the history by which English-speaking peoples had asserted their rights 
against successive rulers.
 
In that history, Magna Carta was one of the 
means that advanced the idea that governmental power should be limited.
 
And that the limits should be expressed in an instrument that might be 
invoked whenever the ruler forgot it or failed to recall how it was secured.
 
It is in this sense that it is relevant today to start a journey to Pyongyang in 
North Korea from the meadow at Runnymede in England. 
 
EUROPEAN CHARTERS OF RIGHTS 
 
In an important case
5
 concerning the requirements of the Australian 
Constitution, Justice Isaacs (later Chief Justice and Governor-General of 
Australia), and a great lawyer and judge,  declared that the Magna Carta 
of England was the “great confirmatory instrument…which is the ground 
work of all our Constitutions”.  
In one clause of the Magna Carta of 1215, Isaacs detected “three basic 
principles, namely, 1)… Every free person has an inherent individual right 
                                                     
4
 For example Anthony Arlidge and Igor Judge, Magna Carta Uncovered (Hart 
2015). 
5
 Ex Parte Walsh and Johnson; In Re Yeats (1925) 37 CLR 36, 79. 
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to his life, liberty, property and citizenship; 2) His individual rights must 
always yield to the necessities of the general welfare at the will of the 
State; 3) The law of the land is the only mode by which the State can so 
declare its will.” 
Whilst Magna Carta (as will be shown) has been treated as 
fundamental, there were, before 1215, numerous instruments that declared 
the rights of subjects vis a vis their rulers.
 
Many kings and nobles in the 
second millennium of the Christian era granted charters to their subjects 
and tenants in terms that were not dissimilar to the provisions of the 
Magna Carta of 1215 (MC 1215).
6
 Indeed, it has been suggested that the 
English Charter reflected the influence of Spanish predecessors.
7 
At about 
the same time as it was granted in England, in 1222, the King of Hungary 
granted a very similar charter.
8 
Moreover, even in England, the Charter of 
1215 had a number of predecessors dating back before the Norman 
Conquest of 1066 to Anglo-Saxon times.
 
The Norman Conqueror 
(William I) himself issued a “brief but stately Charter which is still 
preserved by the City of London”,9 promising respect for the laws of 
“King Edward‟s day”.10 William promised that “I will not endure that any 
man offer any wrong to you.
 
God keep you.”11  
When Henry I acceded to the English crown in 1100, his first act was 
to issue a formal charter, called the Charter of Liberties, promising to stop 
certain oppressive practices that had grown up.
 
His reign coincided with 
conflicts in many kingdoms between national monarchs and the universal 
Church.
 
At issue were the competing claims respectively of the Church 
and the King to select the leading bishops, often the most powerful 
officials of the kingdom.
 To some extent, this dispute in Henry I‟s reign 
was addressed in the Concordat of Worms in 1122.
 
 
Many of the greatest minds of the Middle Ages in Europe devoted 
their attention to this issue.
 
It raised the nature of kingship, the authority of 
royal power and law, and the limits that should be placed on the might of 
                                                     
6
 Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (4th 
edn, London, Butterworths 1948) 25. 
7
 Henry Altamira in Magna Carta Commemoration Essays, quoted Theodore 
Frank Thomas Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (n 6) 25 n 1. 
8
 Ibid 25; noting that it had been translated in André Sayous, Histoire Général des 
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9
 William Stubbs, Selected Charters in ibid 13; Anthony Arlidge and Igor Judge, 
Magna Carta Uncovered (n 4). 
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 St Edward the Confessor, King of England (1031-1066). 
11
 Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (n 
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temporal rulers.
12 
In that dispute lay the seeds of contemporary conflicts 
between the claims made for international law and universal human rights 
(on the one hand) and the sovereign rights of nation states, later 
embellished by claims of democratic legitimacy which the international 
order often appeared to lack.
13
 
The succession in England of Henry II, in 1154, saw the 
reconfirmation of Henry I‟s Charter of Liberties of 1100. Henry II‟s reign 
was one that witnessed great legal developments.
 
Important for present 
purposes is the reminder that, well before the charter in 1215, English 
Kings had been voluntarily and involuntarily subscribing to charters, 
promising to respect pre-existing laws.
 
In that sense, the events of 1215 
were not unprecedented, either in England or in other European States. 
 
THE ENGLISH CHARTER OF 1215 
 
What was novel about the Charter of 1215 was the rebellious and 
dangerous circumstances in which it came about; the detail and 
particularly of the demands of the English nobles who extracted it from 
the King; and the radical means of enforcement to which the King was 
forced to agree.
 
John was an energetic monarch.
 
He travelled extensively 
throughout his kingdom attempting to modernise what we would now 
describe as his administration.
 
However, he was ill-tempered: making 
enemies easily.
 
His political objectives included reclaiming territories in 
France that he saw as belonging to his paternal lineage.
 
For that purpose, 
he demanded taxes and other burdens from the leading families of 
England.
 
They challenged these demands.
 
The disagreement came to a 
head on 12 June 1215.
 
 
The leading barons met the King at Runnymede.
 
John claimed 
indisposition by reason of gout.
 
The barons would have none of this.
 
They 
refused to wait on him in his privy chamber.
 
When he was brought on a 
chair into their presence at Runnymede, they did not stand.
 
Instead, they 
presented him with their Charter.
 
They insisted that he seal it.
 
He did so 
with ill grace.
 
However, in the event, MC1215 was actually in force for 
only 9 weeks.
 
Within that time, the King sent emissaries to Pope Innocent 
III in Rome seeking absolution from his promises, on the basis that his 
will had been coerced, contrary to his conscience.
14
 
                                                     
12
 Ibid 14-15. 
13
 Alferd Aman, The Democratic Deficit: Taming Globalization Through Law 
Reform (New York, NYU Press 2004) 133, 163. 
14
 Told in David Carpenter, Magna Carta (London, Penguin 2015); Anthony 
Arlidge and Igor Judge, Magna Carta Uncovered  (n 4); James Clarke Holt, 
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The Charter was written in Latin, in continuous sentences.
 
Subsequently, it was divided into paragraphs (usually called chapters). 
These set out the obligations extracted from John.
 
There were 61 such 
chapters in all.
 
A number of them repeated clauses of the Charter of 
Liberties of Henry I.
 
Some of the added chapters dealt with the regulation 
of the use of the forests.
 
These were later to be hived off into a separate 
Forest Charter.
 
It was when this happened in 1217 (to be described later) 
that the non-forest chapters were for the first time described as the Great 
Charter (Magna Carta) (MC1217).
15
 For the moment it is enough to quote 
the chief chapters of MC1215 that still have relevance to the issues I wish 
to explore.
 
They were:
16
 
 
“(17) Ordinary law suits („common pleas‟) shall not follow the 
Royal Court around, but shall be held in a fixed place… 
(39)
 
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his 
rights of possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his 
standing in any way, nor will we proceed with force against him, 
or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his peers 
or by the law of the land. 
(40)
 
To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or 
justice. 
… 
(45)
 
We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs or other 
officials, only men that know the law of the realm and are minded 
to keep it well.” 
 
The last mentioned chapter (45) dropped out of the later reaffirmations 
of the MC.
 
So did another chapter, which was the most bitter pill of all for 
King John to swallow.
 
This was the so called “security clause”, in chapter 
61.
 
It obliged local county sheriffs throughout England to take an oath to 
                                                                                                                        
Magna Carta (CUP 2008); Nicholas Vincent, Magna Carta: The Foundation of 
Freedom 1215-2015 (2nd edn, Third Millennium 2015).
 
See review of Dan Jones, 
Magna Carta, The Making and Legacy of the Great Charter (Head of Zeus 2014) 
by Frederick Mount, „Back to Runnymede‟ (2015) 37 London Review of Books 
15. 
15
 James Spigelman, „Magna Carta in its Mediaeval Context‟ (2015) 89 
Australian Law Journal 383, 385. 
16
 Mary Arden, „Magna Carta and the Judges: Realising the Vision‟ (2015) 27 
Judicial Officers Bulletin 49, reproduced from Mary Arden, Common Law and 
Modern Society: Keeping Pace with Change (OUP 2015);
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MAGNA CARTA 1215 TO NORTH KOREA 2015 
 
 
50 
the Charter and to procure the selection of local knights to afford an 
assurance that its promises would be obeyed.
 
It created a council of 25 
members with power to remedy any breach of the promises committed by 
the King.
 It authorised the council to seize the King‟s castles, lands and 
possessions and made a number of other provisions to prevent, or 
discourage, royal evasion.
 
 
Little wonder that, after attaching his seal to these provisions, John 
was described by one unsympathetic observer as “gnashing his teeth, 
scowling with his eyes and seizing sticks from the trees… and gnawing 
them to break them”.17 The ink of the seal was not dry but John sent his 
petition to the Pope in Rome.
 
Because John had settled his disputes with 
Rome and submitted to papal authority in order to secure his support,
18
 the 
result was rebellion.
 
A message was sent to a French prince (later to be 
King Louis VIII of France) inviting for some barons to invade England 
and to assume the English Crown.
 
He accepted the invitation and 
embarked.
 
But, providentially, at that moment, John died and his son 
(Henry III) began his long reign (1216-1272).
 
Wisely counselled by his 
Regent,
19
 John‟s successor reissued and confirmed the Charter in 1216. 
However, it was reduced from 63 to 40 chapters. The security clause 
disappeared never to reappear.
 
Moreover, a new provision required that 
the King would not impose scutage without the “counsel of the realm”.20 
To the idea behind this promise may be traced the constitutional principle 
(as it later developed) that no taxation should be levied on those liable to 
tax, save by their acquiescence, signified in the legislature.
 
 
 
LATER HISTORY OF MAGNA CARTA 
 
The infant King Henry III reissued the promises once again in a 1217 
version, by this time known as Magna Carta.
 
It was, on that occasion, not 
a concession of a weak monarch but a general statement of good 
governance promulgated on the new monarch‟s behalf, to confirm and 
                                                     
17
 Anthony Arlidge and Igor Judge, Magna Carta Uncovered (n 4) 81.
 
See also 
James Spigelman, „Magna Carta in its Mediaeval Context‟ (n 15) 385. 
18
 Including by the appointment of Stephen Langton as Archbishop of Canterbury 
after a five year delay.
 
John not only paid homage to the Pope, acknowledging 
him as his feudal overlord.
 
He also later took a vow as a crusader to further 
extend papal protection for his Crown. 
19
 William Marshal, Earl of Pembroke.
 
See James Spigelman, „Magna Carta in its 
Mediaeval Context‟ (n 15) 386. 
20
 A tax or levy on knights in substitution for military service.
 
It was not finally 
abolished in England until 1660 (12 Car 2, c 24 (1660)). 
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51 
acknowledge the loyalty of those who supported the notions of 
governance that it contained.
 
When he came of full age in 1225, Henry III 
once again reissued and confirmed the Magna Carta. This time it was 
authenticated by his own seal, rather than that of his Regent.
 
One added 
chapter prohibited the grant of freehold land to the Church on condition 
that the donor be readmitted promptly as tenant.
 
Any such arrangement, in 
the future, would result in forfeiture of the land to the Crown.
 
Thus began 
the legislative response to tax avoidance schemes, forms of which are still 
with us.
21 
 
Henry III reconfirmed MC about a dozen times during his reign. 
Eventually he did so in a form that would bind in all his successors.
22 
Although every monarch in England who made great promises sometimes 
broke them, the existence of Magna Carta provided a criterion for 
criticism, civic discourse and occasional rebellion.
 
Effectively, the many 
successive versions of the Charter meant that in England “the King is and 
shall be below the law”.23 Eventually, the 1297 text became the definitive 
version in England when it was entered as the first item in the official 
“Statute Roll” of Edward I By this time, it was viewed as “restorative and 
demonstrative, not constitutive”. It was expressing time honoured rules 
that pre-existed the legal text.
 
 
In the same way today, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(and later human rights treaty law) is taken to express the pre-existing 
fundamental rights of all human beings that emerge out of their very 
nature.
 
In theory, these are rights not granted by the instrument; simply 
recognised, often with provisions contemplating enforceability.
 
The 
MC1215 was expressed in terms of a “grant” of rights by the King, issued 
on the advice (“counsel”) of 11 ecclesiastics, 16 barons and unnamed 
(faithful subjects).
 
This language of “grant” could conceivably 
contemplate the possibility of withdrawal or revocation.
 
However, later, 
the permanent form of Magna Carta of MC1225 (and the settled form of 
MC1297) were different in two important respects.
 
They extended the 
promises to all “free men” and spoke of the relevant “liberties” not merely 
as having been “granted” but as “given and granted”. The additional word 
“given” suggested a free gift by the monarch; something that could 
perhaps not be revoked.
24 
 
                                                     
21
 James Spigelman, „Magna Carta in its Mediaeval Context‟ (n 15) 387. 
22
 MC1237.
 
See ibid 387. 
23
 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law 
Before the Time of Edward I (2nd edn, Cambridge 1911) 173.
 
See James 
Spigelman, „Magna Carta in its Mediaeval Context‟ (n 15) 387.  
24
  James Spigelman, „Magna Carta in its Mediaeval Context‟ (n 15) 389. 
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Summing up the essential features of the Magna Carta, viewed at the 
end of the thirteenth century in which John had first granted it, JJ 
Spigelman describes its essential ideas for the emerging strong system of 
centralised government in the English kingdom.
 
These features were to 
contribute, in the centuries that followed, to the comparative political 
unity, economic prosperity; and institutional strength that were eventually 
to become the foundations of the largest empire that the world has seen:
25
 
 
“First, the acts of the King were not simply personal acts. The 
King‟s acts have an official character and, accordingly, are to be 
exercised in accordance with certain processes.
 
 
Secondly, the Charters affirm, by their very nature and the 
circumstances of their issue and confirmation, the obligation of the 
King to consult the political nation on important issues. 
Thirdly, the Charters restrict the exercise of the King‟s feudal 
powers – subsequently transmographied into prerogative powers – 
in accordance with traditional limits and conceptions of propriety.
 
 
Fourthly, the King cannot act on the basis of mere whim.
 
The King 
is subject to the law and also subject to custom which was, during 
that period in the process of being hardened into [the common] 
law.  
Fifthly, underlying [the] Charters is the proposition that the King 
[in the part]… had acted contrary to established custom, and to 
some degree, contrary to the law [thereby requiring repair]. 
Sixthly, the King must provide a judicial system for the 
administration of justice and all free men [were entitled to due 
process of law].”  
 
ENDURING IMPACT 
 
By the time of the Confirmation in MC 1297, it had passed into a 
generally accepted backdrop for the English law.
 
Other practical steps 
were taken in England to strengthen the development of the judge-made 
common law.
 
These grew, in part, out of the promise of MC 1215 that 
“common pleas” (or ordinary law suits) would not follow the Royal Court 
around, as in Anglo-Saxon and early Norman times, but would be held in 
a fixed place.
 
This idea gave a measure of stability, predictability and 
institutional focus for the law-making machinery of the kingdom, essential 
to the growth of the rule of law and the encouragement of possessions and 
trade.
 
Doubtless influenced by this development, in 1218, salaries were 
                                                     
25
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53 
introduced for the senior justices of England for the first time.
 
Clearly, this 
move was intended to combat corruption.
 
But it also had the consequence 
of improving the quality of the judges and promoting a permanent 
professional judiciary that would evolve, and eventually express, notions 
of independence and impartiality.
26 
The sharing of royal power through 
the King‟s Council was a response, in part, to a succession of infant 
monarchs needing regents.
 
In part, it grew out of the obligations imposed 
on the King by Magna Carta to “seek counsel” on particular royal and 
administrative conduct. 
During the reign of Henry III, a judge and writer, Henry de Bracton 
produced a remarkable book De legibus et consuetudinibus Anglie (On the 
Laws and Customs of England).
 
He did this for the purpose of instructing 
the newly emerging judicial institution.
27 
 Magna Carta, and the strength 
and stability that it contributed to governance in England, encouraged the 
grand design of expounding rationally the whole of the English law as it 
was known in the 1220s and 1230s.
 
Such an encyclopaedic attempt would 
not be repeated for five centuries.
 
 
Sir Edward Coke was a highly influential judge who later reminded 
James I that he was under the law. But he also asserted that the judges 
could overturn Acts of Parliament that were contrary to “common right 
and reason”.28 As a general proposition, this notion has remained 
controversial.
29 
But it was to be developed, in a later age, into more 
modest notions of judicial review including for constitutional validity, that 
came to be highly influential in federal countries.
30 
 
In consequence of Coke‟s views, and the impolitic fashion in which he 
expressed them, James I removed him from office as a judge.
 
He spent 
seven months in the Tower of London on a charge of treason.
 
His papers 
were confiscated.
 
Complaints were made that he was attempting to give 
                                                     
26
 Ibid 395. 
27
 John H Baker, „Bracton‟ in Alfred William Brian Simpson (ed), Biographical 
Dictionary of the Common Law (London, Butterworths 1984) 69, 70. 
28
 Dr Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 107, 118a; [77 ER 638, 652].  
29
 Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 
[2001] HCA 7. 
30
 Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US 1 Cranch 137.
 
Discussed Michael Coper, 
„Marbury v Madison (1803)‟ in Michael Coper, Tony Blackshield and George 
Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia 
(Melbourne, OUP 2001) 453.
 
Applied in R v Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex Parte Whybrow & Co (1910) 11 CLR 1. 
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the judiciary “a superintendency over the government itself”.31 However, 
at least Coke was not executed.
 
Bereft of office he turned his attention to 
legal writings.
 
These included the compilation of his Institutes of the Laws 
of England.
 
They were to be highly influential in later generations, 
particularly in the United States of America when it separated from 
England after the Revolution that began in 1776. 
Magna Carta did not figure strongly in Coke‟s writings. As a sign of 
those times, Shakespeare (writing a little earlier) did not even see fit to 
include reference to the execution and annulment of MC1215 when he 
wrote his History of King John.
32 
The real credit for the revival of 
knowledge about, and interest in, Magna Carta can probably be traced to 
the writings of Sir William Blackstone, more an a century after Coke.
 
Blackstone‟s Commentaries on the Laws of England was influential 
because of two features.
 
First, it was written in a grand style that was 
meant to be read by informed laymen, whereas Coke had basically written 
for lawyers alone.
 
Secondly, it coincided exactly with the loss of the 
American colonies and the severance of their link to the English judiciary.
 
After that severance, more than was the case in England, Australia and 
continuing colonies, Blackstone‟s works served as the basis of legal 
education.
33 
He was a strong advocate for what he saw as the checks and 
balances of English constitutionalism.
 
 
In Blackstone‟s story of the constitutional history of England, Magna 
Carta, the Protestant Reformation, the ultimate ascendancy of Parliament 
(that led to the execution of Charles I); the Glorious Revolution of 1688; 
and the Bill of Rights that followed, were all presented attractively as the 
causes that produced “a constitution with perfect checks and balances”, by 
the time of the publication of his fourth volume in 1769.
34 
 His encomium 
on the carefully calibrated limits upon governmental power was not only 
useful in the follow-up to the American Revolution.
 
In a real sense, 
Blackstone described the features of constitutionalism that had attracted 
                                                     
31
 Attributed to Lord Ellesmere.
 
See John H Baker, „Sir Edward Coke‟ in Alfred 
William Brian Simpson (ed), Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law (n 27) 
117. 
32
 A point noted by James Spigelman, „Magna Carta in its Mediaeval Context‟ (n 
15) 383, who claims that Victorian theatre proprietors added a „Runnymede 
scene‟ to repair Shakespeare‟s inadvertence. 
33
 Gareth Jones, „Sir William Blackstone‟ in Alfred William Brian Simpson (ed), 
Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law (n 27) 57. 
34
 Ibid 61. 
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the American colonists and inspired them to write their own Constitution, 
expressing a form of government that enshrined checks upon power.
35 
 
Chief amongst the checks were protection for a strong judiciary; 
incorporation of basic rights; and acceptance of the judicial umpire in any 
clash between the branches of government.
 
Blackstone‟s text afforded the 
most elaborate history on Magna Carta.
 
It was full of references to 
primary sources.
 Suitably enough, in an engraving from the author‟s 
portrait of 1775 by Thomas Gainsborough which accompanied the 
publication of his Commentaries, the seal of King John is clearly shown in 
a folded document in his right hand, intended to represent “an original 
Magna Carta”.36  It is given pride of place over the Commentaries, that 
appear in the author‟s left hand.  
The idea of a super-constitutional instrument such as Magna Carta not 
only encouraged the American revolutionaries to fashion a written 
constitution that prevailed over all other laws.
 
It also affected the 
dominions and erstwhile dominions, of the British Crown as they adopted 
their post-colonial written constitutions:
 
Canada in 1868.
 
Australia in 
1900.
 
South Africa in 1910.
 
The Irish Free State in 1923.
 
Eventually, the 
same movement spread to non-settler countries beginning with India in 
1950. As the years passed, many countries in the “new Commonwealth” 
witnessed the invocation of the Magna Carta idea.
 
 
In India, for example, a question arose as to the ambit of the express 
power under the Indian Constitution to amend the text of the document.
 
Was every provision subject to formal amendment?
 
Or were some 
provisions to be taken as sacrosanct: so fundamental to the overall design 
that they could not be altered by a mere voting majority?
 
The question 
presented in India was whether Parliament, by the facility of amendment, 
enjoyed the constitutional power specifically to abridge the stated 
fundamental rights.
 
In Golak Nath‟s Case,37 a majority of the Supreme 
Court of India concluded that there were limits on the amending power.
 
                                                     
35
 Ian Doolittle, „William Blackstone and William Prynne: An Unlikely 
Association?‟ in Wilfred Prest (ed), Blackstone and His Commentaries: 
Biography, Law History, (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2009) 56. 
36
 John H Baker, „Iconography, Likenesses, Portraits and Engravings‟ in Wilfred 
Prest (ed), Blackstone and His Commentaries: Biography, Law History (n 35) 
229, 232.
 
See also Wilfred Prest, „Images, Statues and Stained Glass‟ in Wilfred 
Prest (ed), Blackstone and His Commentaries: Biography, Law History (n 35) at 
238, 239 who describes a statue by John Bacon in the Codrington Library, All 
Souls‟ College, Oxford. Another statue appears in Washington DC. 
37
 IC Golak Nath v Punjab (1967) 2 SCR 762; (1967
 
ASC 1643).
 
See Also 
Kesavananda v Kerala (1973) ASC 1461; (1973 supp SCR 1). 
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That great judge, Justice Khanna, concluded that the amending power 
could not do away with such fundamental promises as the basic structure 
or framework of the Constitution: such as the republican nature of the 
state; obedience to the rule of law; and availability of judicial review.
 
However, the fundamental rights provisions were held to fall outside this 
protected zone.
 
Justifying this approach, the respected Indian jurist, H.M. 
Seervai, in his great text, Constitutional Law of India, wrote:
  
 
“… [T]he possession of power [to amend] was one thing, its 
exercise another.
 
In theory, the British Parliament possessed the 
power to repeal great charters of liberty like the Magna Carta 
(1215), the Bill of Rights (1688) and the Act of Settlement (1700) 
as easily as it could repeal a Dog Act, but these great charters have 
remained unchanged.” 38 
 
A “fundamental” rule of constitutionalism may be stated as in Magna 
Carta.
 
Yet, over time, ideas change and even “fundamentals” expressed in 
earlier times need alteration and renewal.
 
Ultimately, the power over the 
content of law (including constitutional law) must generally rest with the 
people who are governed by that law.
 
The people, or their representatives, 
must enjoy the last say. 
 
MAGNA CARTA GLOBAL 
 
The text of Magna Carta was not, as such, generally incorporated as 
equivalent to statute in the far flung colonies of the later British Empire.
 
However, many of the basic principles expounded in the Charter 
profoundly influenced the thinking of the rebels who overthrew British 
rule in North America.
 
Particular ideas of the MC1215 were influential in 
the language of several clauses of the United States Constitution.
 
 
Thus, the establishment of a permanent judiciary, sitting in fixed 
places and not itinerant (MC1215 c 17), is expressly reflected in the 
design of Article III of the United States Constitution.
 
The specific 
prohibition on the seizure and imprisonment of persons and the violation 
of their rights or possessions (MC1215, c 39) is reflected in Amendment 
VI of the United States Bill of Rights: providing for trial by jury in 
criminal proceedings and, in Amendment VII, for civil proceedings and 
respect for the rules of the common law.
 
The promise that justice would 
not be sold, denied or delayed (MC1215, c 40), is reflected in the right to 
                                                     
38
 Hoemasji Maneckji Seervai, Constitutional Law of India – A Critical 
Commentary (3rd edn, Bombay, NM Tripathi 1996) 3115. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
57 
speedy and public trial expressed in Amendment VI of the United States 
Bill of Rights.
 
The promise of knowledgeable and honest judges and 
officials (MC1215 c 45) is reflected in Article II sec 1 of the United States 
Constitution.
 
The retention of the residual powers to the people (in 
Amendments IX and X) of the United States Bill of Rights reflects the 
idea of restrictions on the plenitude of royal powers throughout Magna 
Carta.
 
So does the notion, central to the United States Constitution (and 
others that later followed it), that governmental power is subject to the 
constitution, which all must obey and whose benefits and liberties all may 
enjoy. 
Subsequent national constitutions in former British colonies and 
dominions, copied aspects of both the United States and British 
constitutional arrangements.
 
The Australian Constitution, like the 
Canadian earlier, was a “successful combination of the British system of 
parliamentary government containing an executive responsible to the 
legislature with American federalism”. Federalism itself is a system of 
divided and limited powers, springing ultimately from an idea central to 
divided powers, of Magna Carta. 
In many British colonies, imperial legislation expressly provided for 
English statues to apply, unless the statute was not suitable to local 
conditions
39
 or where the imperial statute made it plain that its terms were 
intended only to apply in what later became Great Britain and Ireland.
40 
The theory was that British settlers took the common law with them to the 
British colonies.
41 
That legal system, its doctrines and principles, were 
described as the “inheritance of the British race, and as such they became 
the common law of Australia”.42 Magna Carta, certainly after MC1297, 
was admitted to the “Statute Roll” of England and was treated in some 
colonies as equivalent to imperial legislation.
 
Yet like other such 
legislation, it could usually be overridden by valid colonial statutes and 
certainly by later imperial statutes and Acts of the legislature, as long as 
they were passed in accordance with the “manner and form requirements” 
prescribed.
43 
 Many of the detailed provisions of Magna Carta were not 
“suitable to the conditions” of the colonies, necessarily established five 
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and more centuries later.
 
However, concerning the principles of general 
importance, the common law would usually treat them as inherited and 
binding principles of law of general application.
 
 
The bias of the common law against arbitrary official intrusion upon 
the person or property of an individual and the centrality of access to the 
law to vindicate rights has been vigorously upheld by the courts in 
commonwealth countries centuries after Magna Carta was written: 
excepting only where valid legislation provided to the contrary.
44 
Sometimes, for the removal of doubt, local legislatures have enacted laws 
to make it clear that Magna Carta in particular chapters is, still to be 
treated as part of the local law unless clearly and expressly overridden by 
a local statutes.
45 
 
Nevertheless, for the most part, the Great Charter operates where it 
does today, as a symbol of large constitutional principles: limited 
governance; legal control over the ruler; responses to abuses of power; 
obedience to the rule of law; access to independent, professional judges; 
observance of divided and separated governmental powers; and respect 
and obedience to the judge-made common law.
 
A society living under 
these principles is different from other societies in the world today.
 
Especially, it is very different from the society that has emerged in the 
Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK), to which I now turn. 
 
II NORTH KOREA 2015 
 
MANDATE OF THE COI 
 
It is a long way in time and space from Runnymede in the England of 
King John, in 1215, to Pyongyang in the time of Kim Jong-un, in 2015.
 
Yet parallels exist between these times and places that need to be noticed.  
King John was the comparatively recently enthroned monarch of 
England.
 
His family had entered that kingdom earlier, accompanied by a 
large armed force from a then much more powerful and influential 
overseas kingdom, France.
 
The family overthrew the local leaders with the 
foreign help.
 
The ordinary people still dreamed nostalgically of an earlier, 
purer kingdom.
 
Like King John, Kim Jong-un is a highly autocratic ruler.
 
Kim causes opponents to be charged with treason and executed.
 
He has 
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resisted demands for the improvement of his regime.
 
He abhors challenges 
to his power. 
In the case of Kim Jong-un, the immediate pressure for change in his 
regime came not from a council of local personalities but from a Council 
comprising representative of the entire world:
 
the Human Rights Council 
(HRC) of the United Nations.
 
On 21 March 2013, the HRC, in virtual 
unanimity, proceeded to establish a mechanism to call Kim Jong-un to 
conform with basic principles of justice, good governance and universal 
human rights.
46 In consequence of the HRC‟s resolution, a Commission of 
Inquiry (COI) was set up to investigate “the systematic, widespread and 
grave violations of human rights” in North Korea. The formal title of the 
country over which Kim Jong-un presides, as Supreme Leader, is the 
Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, as the COI 
was to discover and report, it is neither a democratic country with free and 
fair elections; nor one that engages its people in their own governance; nor 
does it have the hallmarks of a modern republic.
 
Instead, it is, and was, a 
closed land, often described as a “hermit kingdom”. It is like no other land 
in today‟s world – an absolute monarchy where a form of worship of the 
ruler is obligatory.
 
The chief features of the country are set out in the 
ultimate conclusions of the COI:
47 
 
 
“80. Systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations 
have been and are being committed by the [DPRK] its institutions 
and officials.
 
In many instances, the violations of human rights 
found by the [COI] constitute crimes against humanity.
 
They are 
not mere excesses of the State; they are essential components of a 
political system that has moved far from the ideals on which it 
claims to be founded. … 
 
81.
 
[DPRK] displays many attributes of a totalitarian State: the 
rule of a single party, led by a single person, is based on an 
elaborate guiding ideology that its current Supreme Leader refers 
to as “Kim Il-sungism - Kim Jong-ilism”. Supressing all political 
and religious expression that question the official ideology, and 
tightly controlling citizens‟ movement and their means of 
communication with each other and with those in other countries.
 
… 
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82.
 The state‟s monopolisation of access to food has been used as 
an important means to enforce political loyalty. … 
 
83.
 
The keystone to the political system is the vast political and 
security apparatus that strategically use surveillance, coercion, fear 
and punishment to preclude expression of any dissent.
 
Public 
execution and enforced disappearance to political prison camps 
serve as the ultimate means to terrorise the population into 
submission. … [T]he authorities engage in gross human rights 
violations so as to crack down on “subversive” influences from 
abroad. … Persons who are forcibly repatriated from China are 
commonly subjected to torture, arbitrary detention, summary 
execution, forced abortion and other forms of sexual violence.” 
 
In light of these findings, the COI declared that the human rights 
situation in DPRK was “intractable” and that an effective response was 
imperative.
48  
It made a long series of recommendations, including many 
addressed to DPRK itself, calling on it to:
 49  
 
“Undertake profound political and institutional reforms without 
delay to introduce genuine checks and balances upon the powers 
of the Supreme Leader and the Workers‟ Party of Korea; such 
changes should include an independent and partial judiciary, a 
multi-party political system and elected people‟s assemblies at the 
local and central level that emerged from genuinely free and fair 
elections; reform of the security sector… limiting the functions of 
the Korean Peoples‟ Army for defending the nation against 
external threats; and dismantling the State‟s security department 
[placing] the Ministry of Public Security under transparent 
democratic oversight.” 
 
DETAILED REPORT 
 
The report of the COI responded to the nine point mandate given to it 
by the HRC.
 
It began with a history of the establishment of a separate state 
in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula after 1945.
50 
That division 
was imposed upon the Korean people by foreign nations.
 
It terminated a 
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long period of unified, centralised government, including during the years 
1911-45 when Japan suppressed the independence of the Korean State and 
ruled it as a colony.
51 
After removal of the Japanese in 1945, the first 
Supreme Leader, Kim Ill-sung was imposed on North Korea by the then 
Soviet Union.
 
He established the Supreme Leader system (suryong), 
modelled on Stalinist principles.
52 
 He consolidated governmental power 
under the direction of his family.
 
When he died in 1984, he was succeeded 
by his son, Kim Jong-il.
53 
The second Kim instituted a regime fully 
dependent on the military. It proceeded to develop a huge army and 
nuclear weapons with long-range missiles.
54 
Upon the death of Kim Jong-
il in December 2011, dynastic succession passed immediately to Kim 
Jong-un.
 
Shortly before, he and his aunt, Kim Kyong-hui, were promoted 
to four star generals, although neither had any real military experience.
55 
Their appointments were not ceremonial. 
In December 2013, an uncle of the Supreme Leader, Jang Song-thaek, 
(earlier described as the Supreme Leader‟s “control tower” such was his 
role to guide the Leader), was taken under guard from a Politbureau 
meeting; summarily tried by a military tribunal; and executed.
56 
 There 
have been many other recent reports of executions of high officials of the 
DPRK.
57 
The country that emerges from these reports is a violent and 
dangerous place of royal whims and fancies.
 
In that respect it is not unlike 
the kingdom over which King John ruled before his encounter at 
Runnymede. 
 
MC FEATURES OF COI REPORT 
 
The ambit of the report of the COI on DPRK is considerably wider 
than the focus for which Magna Carta is now taken to stand, particularly 
respect for the rule of law (MC1215, c 17); protection of deprivation of 
rights and possessions and outlawry or exile (MC1215, c 39).
 
Provision 
without delay or denial of rights and justice (MC1215, c 40); and 
establishment of settled courts and officials (MC1215, c 45).
 
Thus, 
                                                     
51
 Ibid 27 [110]-[128]. 
52
 Ibid 34 [129]  
53
 Ibid 36 [134].  
54
 Ibid 40 [143]-[148].  
55
 Ibid 41 [149].
 
 
56
 Ibid 43 [157]. 
57
 „North Korea Vice-Premier Executed for Talking Back‟ The Australian (13 
August 2015) 9. Reporting also alleged executions of Choe Yong-gou, reportedly 
killed in July 2015 and former Defence Minister Hon Yong-chol. 
MAGNA CARTA 1215 TO NORTH KOREA 2015 
 
 
62 
chapters of the COI report deal with violations of thought and 
expression;
58 
violations of freedom of movement and residence;
59 
violations of the right to food;
60 
and crimes against persons living 
peacefully in foreign countries through abduction.
61 
 
Important sections of the report of the COI deal with the intrusion of 
the State in DPRK into matters of religious belief.
62 
Magna Carta did 
make provision for the status of religion in England.
 
But in keeping with 
the approach in those feudal times, the only real freedom of religion was 
that of the Lord, whose subjects were obliged to conform to his beliefs.
 
Nevertheless, the first article in the MC of 1215, later confirmed in 1225 
and 1297, signified respect of the King for the Church, which was viewed 
as the “Holy Mother” of the Christian religion (MC1215 c 1): 
 
“1. In the first place we have granted to God and by this our 
present charter have confirmed, for us and our heirs in perpetuity, 
that the English Church shall be free, and shall have its rights 
undiminished and its liberties unimpaired.” 
 
The picture of denial of religious freedom in DPRK is recounted in 
detail in the COI report.
 
It describes a state where one of the four great 
freedoms of Franklin D. Roosevelt (the right to worship God in the way 
desired) is denied.
 Where, even on DPRK‟s own statistics, religious 
adherence has dropped from 23% of the population at the time of partition 
in 1945 to less than 1% today), with much testimony of persecution.
 
The 
COI was uncertain as to whether this dramatic fall was because of the 
murder of religious adherents or simply a reaction to hostile State policy.  
More to the point, several sections of the COI report illustrate the 
arbitrary interference in personal freedom, seizure of possessions; 
proceeding against others by force; and the absence of legal regulation 
over officials in DPRK.
 
In particular, this is demonstrated in the sections 
of the COI report that deal with discrimination on the basis of a state-
assigned social class (Songbun), gender and disability.
63 
 Restrictions on 
the right to move freely in and out of the country and effective systems of 
outlawry and exile in the extensive system of arbitrary detention camps; 
systems of torture; public and other executions; enforced disappearances; 
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and removal of entire families into political prison camps.
64 
The camps in 
particular, remove suspected persons (and their families) into harsh and 
isolated conditions where work is arduous and food is scarce.
65 
 
Although DPRK has denied the existence of such detention camps, 
they were described in compelling detail by witnesses before the COI. 
Moreover, they are confirmed by precise satellite images.
 
They certainly 
exist.
 
They entail crimes against humanity.
 
They are outside effective 
supervision in the ordinary prison system.
66
 They are not under the control 
of independent courts.
 
They represent forms of forced labour amounting to 
enslavement.
67 
They constitute a “vast prison system [with] inhumane acts 
which follow regular patterns that victimise tens of thousands of inmates 
at any point in time.”68   
The COI was unconvinced that there were, in DPRK, any independent 
courts, judges or officials who could enforce accountability for the crimes 
and wrongs described in its report.
 
The COI acknowledged that in other 
places
69 
a partly international and partly national tribunal had been created 
to investigate and establish accountability for the wrongs found to have 
occurred.
70 
 The COI on DPRK went on:
71 
 
 
“[T]hese models rely on the consent of the State concerned. Even 
if the DPRK were to provide such consent, the Commission takes 
the view that, in the absence of profound reforms to the DPRK‟s 
political and justice system, any DPRK judges designated to 
participate in such a high court would lack the impartiality and 
independence to carry out criminal trials that would likely involve 
any very senior officials as defendants.” 
 
The elements of stable courts made up of judges or like officials, who 
know the law and are minded “to keep it well” (MC1215, c 45) is absent 
from the DPRK.
 
This is why the COI recommended referral of the case of 
DPRK to the Security Council of the United Nations.
 
That body has the 
power, under the Rome Statute, to refer the case of DPRK to the 
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International Criminal Court (ICC), even though DPRK is not itself a 
party to the Rome Statute.
 
 
Several sections in the COI report also portray a country that has very 
grave policies and practices of discrimination against women.
 
Women are 
often the citizens of DPRK who have first sought refuge, food and work in 
China.
72 
Attitudes of racial purity in DPRK lead to severe discrimination 
against women who come from China pregnant, or with children fathered, 
by Chinese men.
73
 
The position of women in Norman England was also greatly 
disadvantageous at the time of Magna Carta.
 
However, there were 
provisions in MC1215 which afforded a measure of respect for women‟s 
rights which was enlightened for its time.
 
Thus it was provided:
74
 
 
“Ch 7: After her husband‟s death, a widow shall have her marriage 
portion and her inheritance at once and without any hindrance; nor 
shall she pay anything for her dower, her marriage portion or her 
inheritance which she and her husband held on the day of her 
husband‟s death; she may stay in her husband‟s house for 40 days 
after his death, within which period her dower shall be assigned to 
her… No widow shall be compelled to marry so long as she 
wishes to live without a husband…” 
 
Magna Carta contained, in its successive iterations, important 
protections for the customs of the City of London and for merchants and 
free trade.
75 
The freedom of persons to move between classes was greatly 
restricted by the feudal system in operation when Magna Carta was 
sealed.
 
However, inflexible social regulation by reference to birth and 
class has disappeared today in most parts of the world.
 
It is inconsistent 
with universal human rights.
 
Yet forms of feudal control have been 
imposed in the DPRK by the State-assigned social class system 
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(Songbun).
 
This was devised by Kim Ill-sung.
76
 Indeed, the 
implementation of Songbun was attributed to a purge of rivals of Kim Ill-
sung.
77 
It is difficult to move to a higher social class.
 
Yet it is less difficult 
to move down the ladder.
 
The system appears to have some similarities to 
the fixed inherited social status that existed in feudal Korea.
 
It has been 
strongly imposed in DPRK by the regime, as a method of social and 
economic control.
 
There is now no equivalent social system in the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) (South Korea). 
 
COI FOLLOW-UP 
 
The COI report on the DPRK was approved and adopted by the Third 
Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, reflected in a 
strong vote.
78
 It was then transmitted to the plenary session of the General 
Assembly. This also adopted it with a strong vote that reached across 
geopolitical regions.
79
 Then, in accordance with the recommendation of 
the COI,
80
 two important follow-up proposals were accepted by the United 
Nations.
 
 
First, the General Assembly transmitted the COI report to the Security 
Council of the United Nations.
 
The COI had recommended that the United 
Nations should refer the situation in DPRK to the ICC “for action in 
accordance with that court‟s jurisdiction.” Secondly, the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) implemented the 
recommendation of the COI that a field structure should be established in 
ROK “to help to ensure accountability for human rights violations in 
[DPRK], in particular where such violations amount to crimes against 
humanity.”81  
The placement of the recommendations of the COI before the Security 
Council was itself a step unusual for the United Nations system.
 
Generally, the Security Council avoids direct involvement in human rights 
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issues.
 
However, a procedural resolution was adopted by the Council in 
December 2014, placing the issue of DPRK on the agenda of the Security 
Council.
82 
It will remain on that agenda at least for the next three years.
 
That resolution was also adopted by a strong vote of the Council.
83 
The 
presence of the subject matter on the agenda of the Security Council 
means that it can be raised at short notice, by any Council member, 
including to consider referral to the ICC or, as the COI proposed, to 
“adopt targeted sanctions against those who appear to be most responsible 
for crimes against humanity.”84  
The DPRK has not so far acquiesced in any action demanded by its 
critics.
 
Its response so far has been like the reaction of King John to the 
Magna Carta.
 
It has remained belligerent, hostile and uncooperative with 
the UN Human Rights system. Furthermore, in more recent times, it has 
stepped up hostile military action; entered into a “wartime state” to be 
fully “battle ready” to “launch surprise operations”; and engaged in 
incidents constituting the worst escalation of hostilities between the 
Korean states since 2010.
85 
  
A number of conciliatory gestures offered by DPRK during a “charm 
offensive” in 2013 and early 2014, designed to avoid referral of its record 
to the Security Council, were immediately withdrawn once the Security 
Council added the issue of human rights in DPRK to its agenda.
 
The 
possession of weapons of mass destruction; the recent and current political 
and military posture; and the repeated incidents of violence against its 
own former elite, present the spectacle of a country that is very dangerous 
for its own people, to its neighbours, to the region and (through the risks 
of nuclear accidents or detonations) to the environment of the planet.
 
 
It is this grave escalation of danger that presents the urgent need for 
strong action to implement the COI report.
 
But how will that action come 
about?
 
Can a Runnymede moment be created for Korea? 
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III TEN PARALLELS 
 
ACTION AND REACTION 
 
The demand of the barons for the agreement to a charter was a direct 
outcome of intolerable conduct on the part of King John.
 
Abroad, he 
threatened to conduct expensive and dangerous wars in France.
 
At home, 
he sought to raise taxes; offended the Church; and harmed trade and 
commerce.
 
The Charter was not the product of a popular uprising, like the 
later Peasants‟ Revolt in England of 1381. In 1215, it was an uprising of 
the elite which, at last, responded to what it came to see as intolerable 
strains on the country and their own safety and rights.
86 
 
Witnesses before the public hearings of the COI told of their 
admiration for, and love of, Kim Il-sung.
 
Kim Jong-il developed the 
nuclear arsenal; but he was generally cautious in his handling of the elite.
 
Kim Jong-un, on the other hand, has disappointed the high expectations 
that accompanied his arrival.
 
They had hoped for modernisation and 
liberalisation of the regime.
 
He has proved violent in his disposal of 
enemies and oppressive in his dealings with most of the population.
 
 
Regime change in DPRK was never on the agenda of the COI, any 
more than military intervention in DPRK.
 
That country is a member state 
of the United Nations which created the COI.
 
Military action was not 
contemplated by the COI‟s mandate from the HRC and it had no power to 
propose it.
 
However, ideas from without and within now challenge the 
situation in DPRK.
 
In England in 1215, such challenges led to Magna 
Carta.
 
Where it will lead in the case of DPRK is still unsure.
 
That country 
was not obliged to join the United Nations.
 
Yet, having done so, it is 
obliged to conform to universal human rights.
 
They are expressed in the 
United Nation‟s Charter the UDHR and the treaties that have followed it. 
DPRK has itself ratified several of those treaties.
87
  
Violence begets violence.
 
Discontent growing from chronic food 
shortages, economic impoverishment, technological deprivations and 
other wrongs seem likely to produce demands in DPRK for radical 
reform.
 
Hopefully, such reforms will follow the recommendations of the 
COI addressed to DPRK.
88  
High in the list of those recommendations was 
the introduction of sound principles of governance; the implementation of 
restrictions on the exercise of public power; and the observance of due 
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process and basic rights for ordinary people in DPRK.
 
Just as Magna 
Carta demanded centuries earlier in the case of King John‟s England. 
 
NOSTALGIA FEELINGS 
 
 
The demands expressed by the barons in MC1215 did not purport to 
express fresh insights.
 
They were demands for the restoration of modes of 
governance that had existed during earlier reigns of the Norman and  
Saxon Kings of England.
 
The Norman monarchs prided themselves on 
their strong centralised administration.
 
To some extent, they drew 
legitimacy from nostalgic ideals that were traced back to the reign of the 
Anglo-Saxon King Edward: the only English monarch to have been 
named a saint (“St Edward the Confessor”).  
Whilst some witnesses before the COI clearly contemplated the entire 
replacement of the Kim Dynasty, others were themselves nostalgic for the 
founder of DPRK:
 
Kim Il-sung.
 
In part, that may have been the product of 
propaganda undamaged by current experience.
 
In part, it might have 
derived from his leadership of the DPRK during the Korean War that 
ended in a stalemate.
 
In part, it might be a result of the Soviet 
subsidisation of the DPRK economy before 1989 and the operation, at that 
time, of a comprehensive food rationing system.
 
Whatever the reasons, 
discontent with, and even disrespect for, the regime of Kim Jong-un 
appear to be substantially higher than in the case of his predecessors as 
Supreme Leader of DPRK.
 
 
When King John died in England in 1216, the salvation of his dynasty 
was the conduct of his infant successor (Henry III) under a regency 
controlled by a gifted and loyal leader, the Earl of Pembroke. The closest 
parallel to this in DPRK appears to have been the uncle by marriage of the 
Supreme Leader (Jang Song-taek) who was speedily removed and 
executed.
 
Reportedly, he favoured the adoption of Chinese-styled market 
reforms.
 
His death removed an important actor in a potential process of 
transition.
 
Regents have sometimes been viewed as rivals in history, and 
eliminated.
 
Such appears to have been his fate. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS 
 
An important motivation for the barons who challenged John in 1215 
was their objection to the deployment of royal power on the basis of the 
“whims” of the monarch. An achievement of the earlier Norman Kings 
(and indeed the late Anglo-Saxon monarchs) had been an improved 
system of clerks and processes of consultation (“counsel”) involving a 
form of collective leadership.
 
The absence, and infancy, of some of the 
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succeeding monarchs tended to show that a regent, assisted by a council 
of magnates, could sometimes rule well.
 
They could set a standard of 
administration that a single individual would find it difficult, unaided, to 
attain, simply because of the complexity of a country‟s public affairs.  
The highest bishop in England, the Archbishop of Canterbury - a most 
powerful official at the time of King John – perceived the growing divorce 
between the person of the monarch and the concept of the English Crown.
 
Thus, Stephen Langton (whom Pope Innocent III forced John to accept as 
Archbishop of Canterbury) expressed this notion well:
89 
 
“Loyalty was devotion, not to a man, but to a system of law and 
order which he believed to be a reflection of the law and order of 
the universe.” 
 
A distinctive feature of governance in DPRK is the concentration of 
supreme power in the personal hands of the Supreme Leader.
 
As the COI 
pointed out in its report:
90
 
 
“Apart from exercising power through his dominant role in the 
Party and the National Defence Commission, the Supreme Leader 
also acts as an autonomous decision-making institution.
 
Former 
officials of the DPRK who provided testimony to the [COI] 
underlined that orders issued by the Supreme Leader are 
considered the highest type of normative command, overruling 
decisions of all other Parties or state institutions.
 
The Constitution 
provides the normative underpinning by stipulating that the 
Supreme Leader … “directs the overall affairs of state” [and] has 
the constitutional power to issue orders… superior… to, and 
abrogate, the decisions of any other organ of state.” 
 
According to testimony received by the COI, agencies had to submit 
detailed reports on the implementation of actions involving gross human 
rights violations to the Supreme Leader.
91
  
Symbolising this concentration of power (and illustrating the 
personality cult built around the Supreme Leader) each member of the 
Kim Dynasty is repeatedly shown in media of all varieties, surrounded by 
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adulation and crowds charged with high emotion, sometimes bordering of 
hysteria.
 
Moreover, each of the Kim leaders has toured the country giving 
“guidance”. He is surrounded, by senior officials who are shown taking 
dutiful notes and recording his every word.
 
This is what “guidance” 
involves.
 
It equates to the itinerant conduct of medieval monarchs and 
reverence to their persons.
 
It is not a feature of modern democratic 
governance, where the people, as electors, reserve to themselves a 
questioning and often sceptical attitude about leaders and would-be 
leaders that is healthy.
 
 
It was in 1215 that questioning spilt over into action by the barons in 
England that they presented their charter to John at Runnymede.
 
Just as 
later their successors in England presented an indictment that led to the 
trial, conviction and beheading of Charles I in 1649; the protestation 
against the King”s lawless conduct that drove James II from the kingdom 
in 1688; the demand for a Bill of Rights that was granted in 1689 by 
William III and Mary; as a condition to their assuming the Crown; and the 
assertion of the parliamentary supremacy of the House of Commons 
agreed to by George V in the Parliament Act of 1911 that removed the last 
vestiges of the House of Lords‟ power to defeat or delay indefinitely the 
laws passed by the Commons.
 
These were defining moments in English 
constitutionalism.
 
But where are their equivalents in the constitutional 
narrative of DPRK? 
 
FROM GRANT TO RIGHT 
 
An important feature of the successive versions of Magna Carta was 
that they moved from concessions and grants, in the Coronation Oath of 
Henry II, and in the 1215 Charter of John, to the language of “given and 
granted” in the MC 1225 also and subsequent versions. Moreover, 
arguably, by referring to the “liberties” of “free men”, later versions of 
MC 1215 also acknowledged the antecedent entitlements that the monarch 
was simply recognising (and promising to uphold) rather than “granting” 
(and thus entitled to withdraw).
 
This was a shift from donation (out of the 
ruler‟s supreme powers) to acknowledgment of pre-existence, which the 
ruler agrees to respect as the price of continued kingship.
 
It is an important 
distinction, Archbishop Langton‟s concept of the differentiating of the 
person of the ruler and the office that he or she holds. 
Such a distinction may exist in the minds of some theoreticians of 
DPRK.
 
But it appears nowhere in voice or writing.
 
 In the actuality of the 
way in which the country is governed, as described in the COI report, the 
differentiation is never observed in practice.
 
 Yet it is vital to good 
governance because of the inherent fallibility of all human beings.
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Monarchies still exist in the world.
 
Britain and Australia are amongst 
them.
 
However, the hereditary principle only survives in contemporary 
governance where the Langton differentiation is consistently observed.
 
Then monarchy can be a convenient historical fiction of governance.
 
However, such a differentiation is not observed in DPRK.
 
This fact denies 
the citizens of DPRK a full measure of civic and political (including 
democratic) rights, promised in universal human rights law
92
 and observed 
in varying degrees in most modern nation states.  
 
LIBERTY – CONTROLLING DETENTION 
 
Some of the worst features of DPRK, described in the COI report, 
involve arbitrary conduct by agents of the state, including in the treatment 
of ordinary prisoners; the conditions of prison facilities; the extermination 
and murder of prisoners; the subjection of prisoners and detainees to 
torture, rape and grave violence; the enslavement and enforceable transfer 
of populations; and the lack of effective control over long-term detention 
not only of suspects but of their extended families. 
Functionally, it was conduct of this type in the England of John that 
led to seizure, imprisonment and deprivation of rights without a judgment 
or control by the law (MC1215, c 39).
 
By interposing the scrutiny of a 
decision upon such matters, by a third person official acting in accordance 
with the law, there is built into such actions a dual virtue.
 
It is the 
provision of a second look at public actions by an outsider with a measure 
of dispassion and separation from the original actor.
 
And careful 
examination of the challenged by reference to pre-existing rules that are 
discoverable, upheld and applied by people who know the law and are 
minded to keep it (MC1215, c 45). 
According to the evidence received by the COI, these central features, 
reflected in the concessions extracted from King John in 1215, are not 
present, at least in many circumstances, in the DPRK today.
 
Beyond the 
ordinary prisons, an extensive system of extrajudicial detention camps 
exist.
 
They constitute a form of political prisons where detention, torture, 
executions and enforced disappearances are an ongoing feature of 
uncontrolled governmental power.
93 
 The most basic feature of a civilised 
community is thus missing in DPRK.
 Security of one‟s person and 
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significant possessions is not available, and certainly not from any official 
who is independent of the Supreme Leader and those immediately around 
him.
 
 
 
FEUDALISM TO SONGBUN 
 
Successive versions of charters of liberties in England were extracted 
initially by unlikely champions.
 
Those champions were themselves barons 
and other members of the nobility who were among the main beneficiaries 
of the feudal system.
 
That system governed not only the land law that 
influenced the labour and status of the subjects.
 
It also imposed on them 
duties of loyalty and service according to their rank at birth, which it was 
difficult to escape.
 
 
Into that world, where birth was destiny, was intruded Magna Carta, 
with its promises that went beyond the rights of the barons.
 
The various 
chapters of MC1215 also spoke of the entitlements of the bishops and 
clergy of the Church; of the merchants and traders; and of foresters, 
knights and “free men”. In this sense, Magna Carta was the beginning of 
the end of the universality of feudal fealty to a lord, imposed by birth and 
reinforced by oaths and other means of enforcement. 
In DPRK, as the COI report shows, the assignment of the people to a 
state-specified social class (Songbun) continues to this day.
 
It is the worst 
form of discrimination because of its universality and virtual 
inescapabilty.
94 
 
 
AWARENESS OF THE PEOPLE 
  
When the barons extracted the promises from John, they did not leave 
it in the form of a Latin text on parchment.
 
They provided, in terms, for 
the contents of the Charter to be drawn to the notice of the people of the 
kingdom.
 
Specifically, they provided for the document to be read in the 
great cathedrals, where presumably, at least the educated subjects would 
know and understand and where recorders would translate for the 
common people.
 
Word would get around.
 
In the original Charter, sealed 
by John (MC1215) the barons also created a detailed mechanism to ensure 
that the promises would be kept.
 
This was Ch.61 of the 1215 document 
(“the security clause”). It set out a procedure by which a Council of 25 
persons (archbishops, barons and other notables) were delegated to 
monitor any royal evasion.
 
 
                                                     
94
 Ibid 270-319 [846]-[1021]. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
73 
The members of this extraordinary council were even authorised, in 
the event of evasion, to seize the King‟s castles, lands and possessions. 
Perhaps this is what persuaded Pope Innocent III to annul the document as 
“shameful, demeaning, injust”, as well as “obtained under duress”.95 
Although the security clause was dropped in all subsequent versions of 
Magna Carta, it showed an awareness on the part of the barons of the need 
for enforcement and collective leadership.
 
Later, in 1258, a Council of 25 
was again created to keep John‟s son, Henry III to his word.96  Eventually 
councils of such a kind would evolve into an increasingly insistent royal 
court and later still a Parliament. 
The COI report on DPRK evidences deficiencies in governance of the 
same generic type that exercised the barons of England in 1215. Such is 
the status and power (including constitutional power) of the Supreme 
Leader in DPRK that there are no effective sanctions against him in the 
formal institutions of the country.
 
Moreover, DPRK strictly controls 
access to knowledge and information.
97 
 All forms of media are severely 
controlled by the governing party (Korean Workers‟ Party). Access to the 
internet is generally unavailable to the people.
 
Any having illicit and 
forbidden access (including to popular television dramas from the ROK) 
are monitored by an intense surveillance system.
 
If apprehended, they are 
severely punished.
98
 
 
Freedom of expression is forbidden.
 
 
Despite repeated requests by the United Nations, the report of the COI 
has not been made available to the people of the DPRK, on the internet or 
intranet or otherwise.
 
The COI itself, its members and officers of OHCHR 
were forbidden access to the people of DPRK.
 
Since its report, the COI 
has been denied entry to explain its conclusions and findings, to justify its 
recommendations and answer criticisms.
 
Recommendations for free 
access to the internet has been ignored.
99 
Copies of the COI report, in 
various formats, are smuggled into DPRK.
 
But they are not read to the 
people from cathedrals or their local equivalents.
 
It must be assumed that 
most of the people of DPRK have less knowledge today of the 
condemnations of the United Nations than the ordinary people in 1215 
had of King John‟s Magna Carta. 
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STABILITY AND BELLICOSITY 
 
In 1214, King John had tried to deflect unrest in England by engaging 
in a war against France.
 
His forces were defeated in the Battle of 
Bouvines.
 
This resulted in his loss of lands of the Duchy of Normandy, 
from where the English King‟s family had derived. The failure of this 
overseas distraction resulted in further attempts to raise monies to 
recapture the lost territory.
 
King John continued his unpopular policies at 
home.
 
This led to the now little remembered attempt to invite a French 
Prince to England to take the English Crown.
 
Such overseas distractions 
only came to an end when King John fortuitously died.
 
He was not the 
first, nor the last, ruler to attempt to overcome domestic disaffection by 
embracing a foreign diversion.
 
The Korean War of 1950-1953, beginning 
with an attack by the armed forces of DPRK on the South, eventually 
resulted in the series of misfortunes that still haunt that country to this 
day. 
In DPRK there remains deep animosity towards the United States of 
America, and it Allies, that fought under the United Nations flag in the 
Korean War.
 
Although DPRK has long taught its people that the War was 
commenced by South Korean forces, supported by the United States, 
access to Soviet archives, now widely available and cited in the COI 
report, show that this was false. The war was initiated by Kim Il-sung.
100 
This notwithstanding, the stalemate that followed relief to DPRK, initiated 
by the People‟s Republic of China, certainly enlarged the hostility to the 
United States that continues to the present time.
 
Even food aid, provided 
by the United States during the devastating famine (“arduous march”) of 
1996-8, was represented to the people of DPRK as “reparations” afforded 
by the Americans for their war crimes against DPRK.
101 
 
Hatred and mistrust run deep in DPRK.
 
 Following his election in 
December 2009, a personal letter was sent by President Obama to Kim 
Jong-il.
 
It invited a new beginning to relations between the two countries.
 
 
The President‟s open hand was slapped away. The personal envoy 
carrying his letter was not permitted to deliver it to the Supreme Leader.
 
Instead, soon after, a ballistic missile test was conducted by DPRK that 
overflew Japan in the direction of the United States.
 
Within a month of 
this event, a second nuclear test was conducted by DPRK.
 
And a year 
later, a DPRK submarine torpedoed a ROK naval vessel, killing 56 young 
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ROK sailors.
102 
On the face of things, this constitutes the modern 
equivalent of King John gnawing branches.
 
The appeal now is not to a 
Party or philosopher or a supposedly superior form of governance of 
society.
 
It is to nuclear weapons, missiles and submarines. 
 
INTRACTABILITY AND ACTION 
 
At the end of 1215, with Magna Carta annulled by the Pope, King 
John‟s position had been restored to the condition it was in prior to the 
sealing of the instrument.
 
However, John continued to face many 
challenges, including the imported alternative prince from France.
 
Only 
his human mortality terminated the dangers of an uncertain outcome 
involving invasion and open rebellion.
 
Only the wise regency that 
followed, and a revised Magna Carta, confirmed and reconfirmed, 
changed the direction of English history.
 
 It did so in terms that retained 
the external trappings (and some powers) of the King.
 
Whilst conceding 
the central idea of MC1215 that the King‟s powers were subject to limits 
and separate to some degree from his person.
 
That point has not yet been 
reached in DPRK.
 
 
 
INTERNAL SOLUTIONS 
 
There is one final lesson for the Korean Peninsula today from the 
struggle of King John with Magna Carta in 1215.
 
It is a lesson that goes 
beyond the text or even the context of that document.
 
It arises from the 
situation faced in 1215 and the way the dangers of that time were avoided 
and addressed.
 
 
In the end, solutions were found.
 
But they were found within England 
itself.
 
The immediate solutions (a wise regency; confirmation of a 
modified Magna Carta; and reconfirmation by the same by later kings) 
was by no means the end of the constitutional story.
 
That story continued 
to evolve during later centuries.
 
Subsequent chapters of the story were 
added as the influence of the idea of limited governmental power 
expanded to include England‟s colonies former colonies and dominions 
beyond the seas.
 
Eventually, principles of limited government, the rule of 
law and respect for fundamental human dignity and rights spread far 
beyond the English-speaking countries, with their memories of Magna 
Carta.
 
Through the proclamation of the Four Freedoms during the Second 
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World War, they spread to the whole planet: even beyond countries of 
similar constitutional background.
 
In truth, today, the United Nations 
Charter is a contemporary global reflection of the central idea of Magna 
Carta.
 
That is the idea of limited power in, and between, the nations and 
rulers.
 
This idea now extends to all the countries of the world.
 
 
That extension has come only just in time.
 
Without it, it would not 
have been possible for independent nation states, however powerful, to 
protect the planet, from the ravages of war; the derogations of universal 
rights, the defiance of the rule of law and the debasement justice; the 
oppression of colonialism, apartheid and foreign domination; the dangers 
of HIV/AIDS, ebola, malaria and other diseases; the creeping risks of 
climate change; and the horrors of nuclear proliferation, accident and 
destruction.
 
 
Human history advances by human endeavour.
 
Lodged somewhere in 
the DNA of human beings is a tendency that favours rationality, 
intelligibility and justice.
 
That is why humans have created the United 
Nations.
 
It is why they have created the Human Rights Council and the 
Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
 
It is why they 
established a Commission of Inquiry and a Special Rapporteur on DPRK.
 
It is why the global community must now ensure that the 
recommendations of these office-holders are known, considered and 
followed up with action.
 
 
It is the responsibility of all nations and of human beings everywhere 
to protect the people of DPRK from crimes against humanity.
 
We must 
not default in that responsibility.
 
In 2015 the world, through the United 
Nations, must advance the idea of control over rulers and accountability 
for crimes against the people.
 
One historic source for that grand idea was 
the event that happened at Runnymede in England in June 1215. 
